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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20050952
GARY CHRISTIAN DAVIS
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF

ARGUMENT
THE ENACTMENT OF HOUSE BILL 178 DID NOT
CHANGE THE RULE OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE.
The State concedes that in State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985), the
Utah Supreme Court "carved out, but did not clearly define, an exception for 'innocent
handling' of a dangerous weapon." Appellee's Brief at 10-11. However, the State
contends that the defendant's reliance on Davis is misplaced because the "innocent
handling" of a weapon was criminalized by the intervening enactment of H.B. 178 in the
general session of the 2003 Legislature. Laws of Utah 2003, chapter 235, § 1 (effective
May 5, 2003). See Appellee's Brief at 10.
When Davis was decided in 1985, Section 76-10-503(2), Utah Code
Annotated 1953, read in relevant part as follows:

(a) Any person who is on parole for a felony. .. may not
have in his possession or under his custody or control any
dangerous weapon . . .
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third
degree felony, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm,...
he is guilty of a second degree felony.
In 2000, the Legislature enacted H.B. 363 which repealed and reenacted
Section 76-10-503, creating two categories of restricted persons. See Laws of Utah
2000, chapter 90, § 1 (effective May 1, 2000). Under this bill, a person who had been
convicted of any violent felony or who was on probation or parole for any felony was
classified as a Category I restricted person, while a person who had been convicted of
any other felony or was under indictment for any felony was classified as a Category II
restricted person. Subsection (2)(a), as then amended, went on to provide that a
"Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his
custody or control any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony...."; and subsection
(3)(a) provided that a "Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses,
uses, or has under his custody or control any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony...
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The State is apparently prepared to concede that this complete overhaul of
Section 76-10-503 that occurred in 2000 was not calculated to eliminate what the State
itself has characterized as the "exception for 'innocent handling' of a dangerous
weapon." Appellee's Brief at 11. Instead, the State's brief focuses on the 2003
amendments of Section 76-10-503, arguing that these amendments "clarifie[d] and
narrow[ed] the ambiguous 1985 statute." See Appellee's Brief at 11.

The State's argument is based entirely upon the construction of the
language of the 2003 amendments and avoids any reference to the legislative history.
The 2003 legislation added the underscored language to subsection (2) of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-503:
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or
knowingly agrees, consents, offers, or arranges to purchase,
transfer, possess, use, or have under his custody or control, or
who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers,
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: (a) any
firearm is guilty of a second degree felony;...
Just how the addition of this language is supposed to have criminalized the
"innocent handling" of a dangerous weapon is not clear from the State's argument. See
Appellee's Brief at 11-13. Indeed, the 2003 amendments appear to have been directed
toward the criminalization of conspiratorial conduct, the conscious objective of which is
the purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon.
Representative Ty McCartney, who sponsored HB 178, explained the
legislative objectives as follows:
House Bill 178 modifies provisions related to weapons by
expanding the restrictions on the purchased of firearms by
Category I restricted persons.
* * #

For those of you that don't know, I'm a detective with the
Salt Lake Metro Gang Unit in my real life and what brought
this bill to my attention is the inability to prosecute and arrest
violent gang members that were attempting to purchase
firearms for either themselves or other gang members. In
order to prosecute and arrest them we would actually have to
put an operational firearm in their hands to proceed with the
case. This statute is similar to what the control substance

statute does that's been in place for 20 years. And that's what
this bill is attempting to do.
Tape of House Floor Debates, 55th Legislature, General Session (Jan. 27, 2003).
Following Representative McCartney's introductory comments, the
following discussion ensued:
REPRESENTATIVE CURTIS: Representative, in the
criminal code you have a section in front of the code that
deals with attempt and conspiracy. Why would this . . .
would it not be an attempt to purchase a firearm from a
Category I person underneath that definition of the code?
Why would that not already cover this criminal section?
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: Well, as Mr. Boyden
from the Statewide Association of Prosecutors explained to
me, this is different because they're actually... at the new
language here in this bill can be found online starting on line
36 and line 37. And that is Category I restricted person who
agrees, consents offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer,
possess, use, or have under his custody or control. This is not
an attempt. This is, this is the act that we are trying to
prosecute. Not the attempt to agree, or consent, or offer, or
arrange.
REPRESENTATIVE CURTIS: So is it law enforcement's
position that if I'm a Category I felon and I make
arrangements with you in a bar to purchase a firearm and we
agree to meet in the back of the bar and you show up with a
firearm and I show up with cash and I give you two hundred
dollars cash, that I actually have to take possession of the
firearm in order to be guilty of a crime?
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: Under current law,
yes. We have to actually place a firearm in your hands. Yes.
REPRESENTATIVE CURTIS: So that doesn't constitute ..
. ? What about a conspiracy? If I sit in the bar and I talk with
you about doing that and you tell me, "Yes I know where you
can buy some weapons, and I have a third party that I can call
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and get those," that doesn't constitute a conspiracy to commit
that crime?
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: Then that's a good
question and I would actually like to consult with.... I don't
know. As far as conspiracy, this does not relate to the
scenario that you just gave.
REPRESENTATIVE CURTIS: Thank you then. Mr.
Speaker, the only — the question I raise as representatives is,
if you — often times know we got to turn to our law and order
expertise here, but what happens is if an individual is charged
with attempted homicide or an attempt or a conspiracy to
commit a crime, what it essentially does is that you don't
have all those crimes detailed out in the criminal code. What
you have is the crime detailed out, for example, as homicide
and then the attempt over here says if you take steps to do
that or the conspiracy is if you work with others to conspire
to commit this and so you can have attempt of just about any
crime. You can have an attempt to assault somebody. You
know attempted homicide. You can have an attempted
robbery. All those different things can be an attempt or a
conspiracy. So if you sit down with a group of people and
you plan out how you're going to rob a bank. And you go get
plans and you do all those things and you decide how you're
going to do that, you're guilty of a crime. Now what we've
done here is we've taken this law and said okay we're going
to expand that and we're going to make that the primary
offense is attempt. So I guess the ultimate question would be
is now if you put this in the law and it says you agree, a
person agrees or arranges to purchase, so if I attempt to agree
have I committed a crime? And I just — I understand that this
is what's in the drug code. But I just struggle with the
concept that they're saying — cuz I would disagree with our
prosecutors, okay. If you make arrangements as a Category I
person to purchase a firearm, you meet in the back of the bar
and you give the guy two hundred dollars and then he flashes
out a badge and says, "Sorry, Salt Lake Metro Gang," 'Kay.
It's not going to be much of a defense to say, "Well, I never
touched that firearm." 'Kay. Cuz they don't always show up
in the drug code — they don't always show up with real
drugs. If you think you're buying real drugs, you give money
for that and then they give you a white, powdery substance

that is not real drugs, guess what ~ you're still guilty of a
crime. 'Kay. And so let's make sure if we want to expand
that or not. Thank you.
Id.
Following the debate, HB 178 failed to pass on a vote of 17 in favor of the
proposed legislation and 51 opposed. The bill was revived on Day 12 of the session,
where upon the sponsor offered the following amendments to the proposed legislation
and the reasons therefor:
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: I'd like to move an
amendment.
MR. SPEAKER: Proceed.
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: On line 36, insert after
"who," "intentionally or knowingly." And on line 37, after
"who," insert "intentionally or knowingly."
MR. SPEAKER: Intentionally or knowingly. 'Kay, we have
that. Do you want to speak to the amendment?
ELEPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: Yes, after speaking to
Representative Curtis and calling up his concerns also with
prosecutor Paul Boyden with the Statewide Association of
Prosecutors and also speaking with Utah Gun Owner's
Association, this is all language that makes this palatable.
This increases this to the highest degree of mens rea and also
clarifies the culpability. This does not change the intent of
the bill, it just satisfies the concerns that Representative
Curtis had. With that I believe you know the intent of the bill
and would appreciate your support this time.
MR. SPEAKER: Further discussion to the motion to amend.
Seeing no further lights. Representative McCartney, for
summation.
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: I'll waive.
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MR. SPEAKER: Summation's waived. The motion to
amend is found on lines 36 and line 37. After the word
"who," in both instances, we insert the words "intentionally
or knowingly." Those in favor of the motion to amend say
"aye." Opposed say "no." Motion passes. The bill is for
further discussion. Representative McCartney.
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: I just had one last
comment on this bill. The initial intent of this bill was
primarily focused on felonious gang members, but as I
proceeded with this bill there was a Utah County detective
whose worked numerous murder-for-hire cases, usually
involving murder of spouses and he indicated that this would
be a great bill for him, or a great law to have in place. Often
times the people approaching him wanting, to either have
their spouse killed is looking for a gun first and this would be
at least a first step in addressing his concerns. So, with that
being said, I would appreciate your support in moving this on
to the Senate. Thank you.
Tape of House Floor Debates, 55th Legislature, General Session (Jan. 31,2003).
With this amendment, the legislation was approved by the House of
Representatives.
This is the history of the 2003 amendments. Clearly, this legislation was
not enacted for the purpose of eliminating the "exception for innocent handling' of a
dangerous weapon" which the Utah Supreme Court "carved out" in State v. Davis. See
Appellee's Brief at 10-11. The Legislature overwhelmingly rejected the proposed
legislation until it was amended to require proof of the highest blameworthy state of
mind. Clearly, this legislation was not calculated as a measure that would override the
policy recognized by the language of State v. Davis and would criminalize the brief
handling of a weapon under circumstances which do not evidence "a willing and

knowing possession with the intent to control its use or management." Davis, 711 P.2d
at 233.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the defendant's
conviction of POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED
PERSON must be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of July, 2006.

Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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